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Abstract 
Software debloating is an emerging field of study aimed at 
improving the security and performance of software by re-
moving excess library code and features that are not needed 
by the end user (called bloat). Software bloat is pervasive, 
and several debloating techniques have been proposed to ad-
dress this problem. While these techniques are effective at re-
ducing bloat, they are not practical for the average user, risk 
creating unsound programs and introducing vulnerabilities, 
and are not well suited for debloating complex software such 
as network protocol implementations. 
In this paper, we propose CARVE, a simple yet effective se-
curity-focused debloating technique that overcomes these 
limitations. CARVE employs static source code annotation to 
map software features source code, eliminating the need for 
advanced software analysis during debloating and reducing 
the overall level of technical sophistication required by the 
user. CARVE surpasses existing techniques by introducing 
debloating with replacement, a technique capable of preserv-
ing software interoperability and mitigating the risk of creat-
ing an unsound program or introducing a vulnerability. 
We evaluate CARVE in 12 debloating scenarios and demon-
strate security and performance improvements that meet or 
exceed those of existing techniques. 
1. Introduction 
Software bloat affects almost all software, negatively impact-
ing security and performance in a variety of ways [1, 6, 7]. 
The primary source of bloat is feature creep, the tendency of 
software packages to accumulate new features over time [8]. 
End users are unlikely to use all features provided by a soft-
ware package; unnecessary features are a security risk as they 
may contain software vulnerabilities or be useful to an at-
tacker crafting a code reuse exploit. Another source of bloat 
is a result of software engineering practices that favor re-use 
of modular software libraries. Programs typically use a small 
subset of the functionality provided by each external library 
[1], yet the entire library is loaded into the program’s memory 
space at runtime. As is the case with unnecessary features, 
excess library code may be useful for crafting code reuse at-
tacks and also increases memory consumption at runtime.  
Several debloating techniques [2-5, 9-10, 18] have been 
proposed that promise to improve software security and per-
formance by eliminating unnecessary features and excess li-
brary code. While these approaches have been shown to be 
effective at reducing bloat, they have serious limitations that 
diminish their potential for use in real-world software engi-
neering projects and security-focused debloating. 
1.1.  Motivation 
Existing feature-based debloating techniques rely on com-
plex specifications and advanced software analysis tech-
niques. They have a high technical barrier to entry, and are 
outside the reach of the typical user. For example, CHISEL [3] 
requires a user-provided test script that compiles the source 
code, executes it with inputs corresponding to desired and un-
desired features, and tests the output of each run to determine 
if the resulting program is correct [14]. Even for small pro-
grams, CHISEL requires long, complex scripts that test a large 
number of concrete inputs to produce debloated variants. 
Other approaches, such as TOSS and TRIMMER [2, 4], require 
the user to interact with sophisticated tools such as LLVM, 
angr, and TEMU [11-13] to debloat software.  
Despite their complexity, existing techniques are not capa-
ble of preserving desirable software properties such as grace-
ful error handing, user experience, specification compliance, 
and interoperability. Because these techniques are only capa-
ble of removing code, their resulting debloated programs can-
not respond in a meaningful way to attempts to invoke 
debloated functionality. For example, invoking debloated be-
havior in CHISEL benchmark programs [14] results in the pro-
cess terminating with no meaningful output. Network proto-
col implementations are particularly affected in terms of in-
teroperability. Specification-compliant requests for removed 
functions made to server software debloated by TOSS cannot 
respond in a protocol compliant manner, as there is no longer 
code to handle such requests. The client will likely misinter-
pret this behavior as a connection failure rather than an un-
implemented feature, for which there is typically a well-
formed response (HTTP code 501, FTP code 502, etc.). 
Existing approaches also have several limitations with re-
spect to debloating for security. Techniques that use dynamic 
analysis to guide debloating such as CHISEL and TOSS can 
produce unsound programs and introduce new vulnerabilities 
as a result of the imprecise manner in which feature related 
code is identified [18]. New vulnerabilities can also be intro-
duced by debloaters operating at the source code level that 
are only capable of code removal (e.g. CHISEL), due to the 
potential for interaction between feature-specific code and  
code not associated with a feature. As shown by Brown and 
Pande [22], techniques that permanently alter the program’s 
representation can introduce new code reuse gadgets in un-
predictable ways. Gadget introduction can negatively impact
Figure 1: Overview of CARVE. 
security, and properly mitigating this effect may require mul-
tiple debloating/analysis iterations to achieve a desirable re-
sult. Techniques such as CHISEL are not well suited for this 
task, as debloating operations can take hours to complete [3]. 
1.2.  Contributions 
In this paper, we present CARVE: a simple yet effective se-
curity-focused debloating technique designed to overcome 
the limitations of existing approaches. CARVE (Figure 1) does 
not use dynamic analysis to identify feature related code; in-
stead, users statically map features directly to the source code 
that implements them using simple and flexible comment-
based mappings similar to those commonly used by the soft-
ware engineering community. These feature mappings allow 
the user to perform sound, fine-grained debloating that op-
tionally replaces debloated code with replacement code that 
preserves high level program properties like protocol compli-
ance and prevents the introduction of vulnerabilities. CARVE 
debloats software in a preprocessing pass, taking feature 
mapped source code and a configuration file identifying un-
desired features as input. CARVE scans the source code and 
intelligently removes code associated with the undesired fea-
tures, inserting replacement code as indicated by the map-
pings. Debloating is fast and efficient, as it is decoupled from 
feature mapping. The final product is a reduced version of the 
source code containing only desired features that can pro-
cessed without making changes to the build chain. We dis-
cuss the implementation details of CARVE in Section 2. 
We evaluated CARVE by using it to debloat features from 
four network protocol implementations at varying levels of 
aggressiveness. Debloating this class of software is challeng-
ing due to its input / output complexity, compliance to speci-
fication, interoperability across platforms, and stateful na-
ture. We analyzed the debloated variants produced by our ap-
proach and observed security and performance benefits 
including vulnerability elimination, reduction in code reuse 
gadget set utility, code size reduction, and external depend-
ency elimination. We present the results of our evaluation in 
Section 3. We compare CARVE to existing techniques, discuss 
its limitations, and identify future work in Section 4. 
2. Design 
Feature-based debloating techniques must perform two tasks: 
mapping software features to the source code that implements 
them and removing feature code according to a user specifi-
cation. Existing techniques [2, 3] approach the first task dy-
namically by executing the program with concrete inputs cor-
responding to desired and undesired features, and analyzing 
the resulting execution paths or program output. These meth-
ods have several limitations when used for debloating. First, 
they require the user to provide a complex specification or 
use advanced software analysis tools to generate this map-
ping. They also cannot be used to identify software features 
that are non-deterministic, triggered by external conditions 
(e.g. congestion control), or do not produce observable output 
(e.g. performance features). Scalability is also a concern, 
since a large number of executions may be required to ensure 
that the generated mapping is correct. As a consequence, the 
cost of these approaches grows with the input space and exe-
cution time of the target program, which may prove cost-pro-
hibitive for large, feature-rich programs. 
CARVE overcomes these limitations by using a static fea-
ture mapping technique in which the user places mappings 
directly in the target program’s source code. Embedding the 
feature mapping as comment-based metadata is familiar task 
for software developers; this method is used in popular auto-
mated software documentation tools such as Doxygen and 
Sphinx [24, 25] and functions similarly to C/C++ preproces-
sor directives. Additionally, comment-based feature map-
pings are not limited to input-triggered features, and can be 
placed at instruction-level granularity. 
The primary disadvantage to this approach is the manual 
effort required to annotate the source code with feature map-
pings. Depending on the size of the code base and complexity 
of the features to be marked as debloatable, the manual effort 
required to generate feature mappings may be significant. 
However, we found that this was not the case in practice. 
Modern software engineering places heavy emphasis on code 
modularity, refactoring, and separation of concerns, which 
allows for one to one mapping of the majority of software 
features to their associated source code.  
CARVE further mitigates this disadvantage by incorporat-
ing several design elements that reduce the effort required for 
the user to produce the initial set of feature mappings. Since 
feature mappings are static and persist within source code, the 
cost to produce the initial mapping need only be paid once. 
Additionally, software features can be nested within a feature 
hierarchy, simplifying the task of mapping a segment of code 
to multiple related features. CARVE also supports implicit fea-
ture mappings that trigger syntax-aware debloating for com-
mon code constructs, which automatically handle control-
flow implications of code removal. Implicit mappings pro-
vide rich debloating support that goes far beyond that of pre-
processor directive schemes. 
2.1.  Feature Mapping Anatomy  
Figure 2 contains sample code with embedded feature map-
pings. Feature mappings consist of three parts. The first part 
is a user configurable tag (///), that differentiates code com-
ments from feature mappings. Immediately following the tag, 
the user specifies one or more feature names, each enclosed 
within a pair of square braces ([ ]). This feature list marks 
the mapped code as debloatable if the user specifies all of the 
features for removal. The final part is the optional operator, 
which is used to differentiate between explicit file mappings, 
explicit segment mappings, and implicit mappings. 
2.2.  Explicit Feature Mappings 
CARVE supports two types of explicit feature mappings 
(bold blue in Figure 2). File mappings are indicated by the 
! operator, and instruct the debloater to remove all code in 
the file if the specified features are all undesired. Segment 
explicit mappings are indicated by the ~ operator, and instruct 
the debloater to remove code between the mapping and the 
next occurring termination tag (///~). Replacement code 
segments can also be specified between the two replacement 
tags (///^) for segment for segment explicit mappings. For 
example, the debloating with replacement mapping on line 13 
instructs the debloater to remove the code on lines 17-19, and 
replace it with the code on line 15. 
2.3.  Implicit Feature Mappings 
Implicit feature mappings (bold green in Figure 2) reduce 
the effort required to generate feature mappings by offloading 
two key tasks to the debloater. First, implicit mappings do not 
require a termination tag to mark the end of the code segment 
associated with a mapping. Implicit mappings instruct the 
debloater to analyze the code following the mapping to deter-
mine its structure, and by extension what code should be re-
moved. Implicit mappings also obviate the need to handle 
predictable control-flow implications associated with certain 
types of code constructs by using explicit mappings with re-
placement code. For example, mappings preceding switch 
cases or conditional branches instruct the debloater to analyze 
Figure 2: Example Code with Feature Mappings. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
the control-flow implications of removing the mapped code, 
and debloat the code in way that does produce unintended 
control-flow for the resulting debloated program. Examples 
of implicit mappings are shown in Figure 2. When processing 
the mapping on line 9, the debloater will recognize that the 
code following the mapping is a single statement, and remove 
only line 10. The mappings on lines 22 and 25 target function 
definitions; in these cases, the debloater will scan for the clos-
ing brace associated with the function definition to determine 
the which lines to remove. The debloater will remove line 23 
and lines 26-32 for these mappings, respectively. 
Figure 3 shows examples of debloating code constructs 
with control-flow implications. The code on the right results 
from debloating Feature_B from the code on the left. Dur-
ing syntax-aware analysis of the switch case on line 4, the 
debloater will determine that the mapped code on lines 6 and 
7 are reachable due to the absence of a break statement. In 
this case, the debloater cannot remove these lines and can 
only remove the case label. Similarly, the debloater will ana-
lyze the conditional branch structure on lines 12 and 13 and 
determine that the presence of an else block in the branching 
construct prevents removal of the entirety of line 12. To 
maintain the correct branching behavior for the else block, 
only the body of the else if block can be debloated. 
Processing implicit mappings in the debloater requires syn-
tax-aware analysis that is specific to different programming 
languages. For this reason, CARVE’s design supports the 
0:  ///[FeatureGroup_A][Feature_G]! 
1:   
2:  #include <stdio.h> 
3:  
4:  ///[Feature_Y]~ 
5:  int a = 0; 
6:  int b = 1; 
7:  ///~ 
8:  
9:  ///[Feature_Z] 
10: char msg[10]; 
11: 
12: int func_y (int i, int j){ 
13:     ///[Feature_Y]~ 
14:     ///^ 
15:     ///return 0; 
16:     ///^ 
17:     int ret = i + a; 
18:     int temp = b - j; 
19:     return ret * temp; 
20:     ///~ 
21: } 
22: ///[Feature_Z] 
23: void func_z(int k){ printf(msg);  } 
24: 
25: ///[Feature_G] 
26: int func_g (int i){ 
27:     int j = func_y(i, 3); 
28:     ///[Feature_Z] 
29:     if(j<0){  func_z(j); } 
30:     else{ j = j + i;  } 
31:     return j; 
32: } 
 
Figure 3: CARVE Transformations for Code with Control-Flow Implications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
creation of custom, language-specific debloating modules for 
future expansion. The resource debloater for C/C++ supports 
implicit mappings for individual statements, function and 
struct definitions, switch cases, and conditional branches. 
2.4. Expressive Power 
We found that implicit feature mappings are sufficiently ex-
pressive to correctly identify code implementing a feature in 
the vast majority of cases. Due to the flexibility of high-level 
programming languages, there are situations in which im-
plicit mappings are insufficient. In these cases, segment ex-
plicit mappings should be used with replacement code if nec-
essary. These mappings are capable of arbitrary removal and 
replacement of code, and are sufficiently expressive for any 
debloating operation. Across all four of our benchmarks, use 
of explicit mappings in this manner was required for only 5 
of 668 total mappings. 
2.5. Debloater Operation 
The static feature mapping scheme used in CARVE decouples 
the task of mapping features to code from the task of debloat-
ing the code. As a result, debloating is a straightforward and 
inexpensive operation. CARVE takes as input a single config-
uration file specifying the location of the feature mapped 
source code, the programming language the code is written in 
(used to select the correct syntax-aware debloating module), 
the hierarchy of all debloatable features, and the list of fea-
tures the user wishes to debloat. When executed, the de-
bloater makes a copy of the specified source code directories, 
and begins scanning the feature mapped source code. When 
feature mappings are found, the debloater compares them to 
the features specified for debloating. If the feature mapping 
is a subset of or equal to the features specified for debloating, 
the debloater processes the mapping. Otherwise, the 
debloater continues the scan until all files have been scanned. 
2.6. Soundness  
Assuming that the user provided feature mapping (including 
replacement code) is correct, CARVE is a sound debloating 
technique. The individual transformations performed by the 
debloater are sound with respect to program syntax and con-
trol-flow. The static feature mapping scheme is fine-grained 
and directly maps features to the source code that implements 
them; therefore, a correct mapping does not miss code asso-
ciated with features or mis-associate code with a feature it 
does not implement. The same cannot be said for dynamic 
approaches. CHISEL has been shown to introduce vulnerabil-
ities and cause unexpected program behavior in the author’s 
benchmarks due to limitations inherent to dynamic analysis 
[18]. The feature identification mechanism used by TOSS 
cannot guarantee that all feature code is identified; post-
debloating fuzzing of both desired and undesired functional-
ity is required to test for unsound variants [2]. 
Debloating source code is challenging due to its highly ex-
pressive nature. There are instances where it is not possible 
to remove code without producing an unsound program or 
introducing a vulnerability, especially when considering high 
level security policies. Consider the example in Figure 4. 
Debloating either case from the switch statement does not vi-
olate language semantics, but does result in the execution of 
the protected function without prior authorizing the creden-
tials. CARVE mitigates this by supporting debloating with re-
placement, allowing the user to properly handle the implica-
tions of removing source code. In our example, the switch 
case can be replaced during debloating with exception han-
dling code that traps execution before the protected function. 
As is the case with writing source code, creating a feature 
mapping can be an error prone process. In practice, errors 
made during the creation of a feature mapping can be identi-
fied using the same tools used to ensure that the source code 
itself is sound. Mapping errors that result in violations of lan-
guage semantics will be caught by the compiler. Mapping er-
rors present in code that successfully compiles can be 
Figure 4: Vulnerability Introduction via Code Removal 
 
 
 
Before Debloating After Debloating 
0:  // Switch Case Example 
1:  switch (variable) { 
2:      ///[Feature_A] 
3:      case FEATURE_A_SPECIFIED: 
4:      /// Case Label Debloated. 
5:        length = 2; 
6:        break;      } 
7:  // If / Else if / Else Example 
8:  ///[Feature_A] 
9:  if (cond_A)      { handle_A(input); } 
10: else if (cond_B) { /// Code Block Debloated.} 
11: else             { handle_generic(input); } 
 
0:  // Switch Case Example 
1:  switch (variable) { 
2:      ///[Feature_A] 
3:      case FEATURE_A_SPECIFIED: 
4:      ///[Feature_B] 
5:      case FEATURE_B_SPECIFIED: 
6:        length = 2; 
7:        break;      } 
8:  // If / Else if / Else Example 
9:  ///[Feature_A] 
10: if (cond_A)      { handle_A(input); } 
11: ///[Feature_B] 
12: else if (cond_B) { handle_B(input); } 
13: else             { handle_generic(input); } 
switch(auth_type){ 
    case 1: perform_auth_1(creds); break; 
    case 2: perform_auth_2(creds); break; 
} 
protected_function(); 
Table 1: Summary of Security Improvements (C: Conservative; M: Moderate; A: Aggressive). 
Values Indicate Count (and Number Reduced) of Expressive Classes and Gadgets.   
Gadget Set Expressivity Special Purpose Gadget Availability 
Debloated 
Variant 
CVEs 
Removed 
Practical 
ROP 
Exploits 
ASLR-Proof 
ROP 
Exploits 
Turing  
Complete 
Exploits 
Syscall 
Gadgets 
JOP  
Dispatcher 
Gadgets 
JOP  
Data Loader  
Gadgets 
JOP  
Trampoline  
Gadgets 
COP  
Dispatcher  
Gadgets 
COP Intra  
Stack Pivot  
Gadgets 
libmodbus (C) 0 of 0 6 (0) 10 (3) 6 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 3 (-2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
libmodbus (M) 0 of 0 6 (0) 13 (0) 7 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
libmodbus (A) 0 of 0 6 (0) 13 (0) 7 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Bftpd (C) 0 of 0 7 (-1) 12 (3) 6 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 9 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Bftpd (M) 0 of 0 7 (-1) 17 (-2) 6 (1) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (9) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
Bftpd (A) 0 of 0 6 (0) 11 (4) 5 (2) 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (9) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
libcurl (C) 1 of 6 9 (0) 26 (-1) 11 (-1) 5 (-1) 7 (1) 50 (1) 0 (1) 304 (15) 4 (0) 
libcurl (M) 2 of 6 9 (0) 24 (1) 10 (0) 0 (4) 4 (4) 41 (10) 0 (1) 287 (32) 3 (1) 
libcurl (A) 1 of 6 10 (-1) 24 (1) 10 (0) 4 (0) 3 (5) 14 (37) 1 (0) 170 (149) 2 (2) 
mongoose (C) 5 of 17 7 (0) 10 (6) 8 (0) 0 (0) 1 (-1) 6 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
mongoose (M) 1 of 17 7 (0) 10 (6) 8 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 6 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
mongoose (A) 8 of 17 7 (0) 10 (6) 8 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 6 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 0 (0) 
identified with common testing techniques such as unit and 
integration testing. Security concerns, such as inadvertent re-
moval of bounds checks, can be identified using common 
static analysis tools like Coverity [26]. 
3. Evaluation 
To evaluate CARVE, we selected four software packages im-
plementing network protocols that vary in size, feature den-
sity, and complexity. Debloating network protocol imple-
mentations is a challenging and realistic problem due to their 
complex interactions and adherence to strict specifications. 
The software packages we selected are: 
• libmodbus v3.1.4, an industrial protocol library.  
• Bftpd v4.9, an FTP server utility program. 
• libcurl v7.61.0, a data transfer utility library. 
• mongoose v.6.8, an embedded web server library. 
For each package, we manually created feature mappings 
at various levels of granularity, as well as three different 
debloating configurations (additional details are included in 
Appendix A). These configurations were selected to reflect 
reasonable real-world use cases corresponding to aggressive, 
moderate, and conservative debloating scenarios. We define 
these levels in the following common language: 
• Conservative (C): Some peripheral features in the pack-
age are targeted for debloating. 
• Moderate (M): Some peripheral features and some core 
features are targeted for debloating. 
• Aggressive (A): All debloatable features except for a 
small set of core features are targeted for debloating. 
In each scenario, we debloated the package with CARVE 
and built the resulting variant using the default package build 
configuration and GCC v7.3.0. All software packages and 
their debloated variants were built on the same platform, with 
configurations kept constant for each build. We tested all  
variants using a combination of developer-provided test 
scripts and custom testing scripts to ensure that they were 
correct with respect to kept features, and that inputs invoking 
debloated features did not cause the variant to crash. 
3.1. Security Improvements 
The most compelling security benefit of debloating software 
features is the potential to eliminate software vulnerabilities 
contained within these features. To demonstrate CARVE’s po-
tential for vulnerability elimination, we searched the CVE da-
tabase [19] for known vulnerabilities affecting our selected 
software packages. There were no listed CVEs for libmod-
bus and Bftpd, however there are six known vulnerabilities 
affecting libcurl and 17 affecting mongoose. We analyzed 
the debloated versions of our selected packages to determine 
how many vulnerabilities were actually eliminated in our sce-
narios. Our results are shown in column two of Table 1. 
Another commonly cited security benefit of debloating 
compiled software is increased resistance against code re-use 
attacks. Code re-use attacks redirect execution to existing in-
structions in memory to cause a malicious effect. In gadget-
based code reuse attack methods such as ROP, JOP, and COP 
[15, 16, 17], execution is redirected to an ordered chain of 
short instruction sequences (gadgets) present in the program 
to construct a malicious payload without injecting code. 
Debloating unnecessary software features eliminates the 
gadgets found in the code implementing these features. Meas-
uring the security benefit of debloating against gadget-based 
code reuse attacks is complicated because code-removing 
debloaters like CARVE, TRIMMER, and CHISEL may introduce 
new gadgets as a side effect of feature elimination [22]. We 
measure CARVE’s effectiveness against gadget-based attacks 
using metrics proposed by Brown and Pande [22], special 
purpose gadget availability and gadget set expressivity. Our 
results are shown in the grouped columns of Table 1.  
In general, CARVE is effective at reducing expressivity of 
gadget sets with respect to three different levels of expressiv-
ity [20, 21]. In seven of the twelve scenarios, debloating re-
duced the overall gadget set expressivity. However, 
debloating had no effect in three scenarios and negative ef-
fects in two scenarios. CARVE was also generally successful 
at removing special purpose gadgets, achieving the highest 
reduction for libcurl. As was the case with gadget set ex-
pressivity, negative side effects were observed in two scenar-
ios. The negative side effects observed in our results are con-
sistent with the negative side effects observed in CHISEL [22] 
and TRIMMER [4]. Since CARVE is easy to reconfigure and de-
bloating is fast, it is well suited for mitigating these negative 
side effects using iterative debloating [22].  
3.2. Code Size Reduction 
CARVE is also capable of significantly reducing the size of a 
software package. The average LOC, function count, and bi-
nary size reduction achieved at each level aggressiveness is 
displayed in Table 2. Interestingly, we observed slightly 
higher binary reduction than anticipated, which we attribute 
to improved performance by downstream compiler optimiza-
tions operating on simplified debloated code. 
In some cases, debloating also eliminates dependencies on 
external libraries. This lowers runtime memory consumption 
as these libraries are no longer loaded during execution. 
Eliminating these libraries may also have positive security 
impacts if they may contain code and gadgets useful  in a code 
reuse exploit. We did not observe a reduction in required li-
braries for libmodbus, Bftpd, and mongoose. While con-
servatively debloating libcurl only reduced the number of 
required libraries from 42 to 41, we observed a two-thirds re-
duction in required libraries for moderate and aggressive var-
iants of libcurl (28 and 29 eliminated respectively).  
Table 2: Average Code Size Reduction. 
Level of  
Aggressiveness 
LOC 
Reduction 
Function Count 
Reduction 
Binary Size 
Reduction 
Conservative (C) 10.7% 11.1% 10.8% 
Moderate (M) 16.1% 13.7% 18.5% 
Aggressive (A) 31.3% 27.1% 33.0% 
3.3. Overhead Costs 
CARVE’s decoupled design minimizes per-debloat overhead. 
Debloating is fast and efficient, taking less than 5 seconds for 
each scenario. Debloating also scales effectively with in-
creasing code size and density of feature mappings. 
The vast majority of cost associated with this technique oc-
curs during feature mapping. The amount of effort required 
to create and maintain feature mappings depends on a number 
of variables, including the user’s familiarity with the soft-
ware, feature density, and complexity of the target software. 
In practice, we found that creating the initial feature mapping 
was not cost-prohibitive in situations where the user has lim-
ited familiarity with the source code. Software engineering 
practices favor modularization and separation of concerns 
within software packages, which has the effect of reducing 
the number of feature mappings required to produce a sound 
mapping. Producing a mapping for our benchmark packages 
required 61.5 mappings per thousand LOC (m/KLOC) for 
libmodbus, 24.2 m/KLOC for Bftpd, 13.4 m/KLOC for 
mongoose, and 4.9 m/KLOC for libcurl. Additionally, 
these mappings did not require a significant number of com-
plex code-replacing mappings; Bftpd and mongoose re-
quired no such mappings, libmodbus requires 17, and lib-
curl required 20. This data suggests that the one-time costs 
of creating feature mappings are reasonable. 
4. Discussion  
4.1. Comparison to Existing Techniques 
Aggressively debloating simple programs (e.g. Linux Core-
Utils) with CHISEL and TOSS results in average code size re-
ductions of 86% and 43.8% respectively [2, 3]. Aggressively 
debloating more complex network-based software (e.g. cUrl) 
with TRIMMER reduces code size by 21% on average [4]. 
CARVE outperforms TRIMMER on similar benchmarks, and 
performs comparably to CHISEL and TOSS when accounting 
for benchmark selection. CARVE also performs comparably 
to CHISEL with respect to CVE elimination [3]. Finally, 
CARVE reduces gadget counts and introduces new gadgets at 
rates comparable to CHISEL and TRIMMER [22, 4]. 
 4.2. Limitations 
CARVE operates solely on source code and cannot be used to 
debloat binaries directly; it is not a suitable for closed-source 
or legacy software. While CARVE is technology independent 
and can be used on any software that is text-based and sup-
ports comments, at this time it implements only one lan-
guage-specific debloating module: C/C++.  
4.3. Future Work 
In future versions of CARVE, we plan to create new language-
specific debloating modules for other common programming 
languages such as Java and Javascript. We also plan to de-
velop static analysis tools to assist the user in quickly produc-
ing sound feature mappings. Such tools would analyze map-
pings created by the user in real time to suggest new map-
pings and identify potential soundness issues associated with 
individual debloating operations. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we introduced CARVE, a simple and powerful 
software debloating technique that overcomes the shortcom-
ings of existing approaches. We demonstrated that effective 
debloating can be accomplished without the need for ad-
vanced software analysis and in a manner that preserves de-
sirable software properties like interoperability and specifi-
cation compliance. The results of our evaluation show that 
CARVE is well-suited for the challenging problem of debloat-
ing network protocols, improving the security and perfor-
mance of four protocol implementations. Across 12 scenar-
ios, CARVE eliminated vulnerabilities, reduced the utility of 
code reuse gadgets, and reduced overall code size on par with 
existing approaches using a simple technique that is accessi-
ble to the average user. 
A. Appendix 
The following tables detail which features were mapped for each benchmark, and which were debloated in each scenario. For 
brevity, the complete list of fine-grained debloatable features in the package are condensed into the categories in the leftmost 
column. Features removed by CARVE are marked with an X in that scenario’s column.  
Table A.1: Debloated features per scenario for libmodbus. 
Debloatable  
Feature 
Conservative 
Scenario 
Moderate 
Scenario 
Aggressive 
Scenario 
RTU Read  
Operations X   X 
RTU Write  
Operations X 
 X 
RTU Raw  
Operations X   X 
TCP (IPv4) Read  
Operations 
 X X 
TCP (IPv4) Write  
Operations 
 X X 
TCP (IPv4) Raw  
Operations 
 X X 
TCP (IPv4/6) Read  
Operations   X   
TCP (IPv4/6) Write  
Operations   X X 
TCP (IPv4/6) Raw  
Operations   X X 
 
Table A.2: Debloated features per scenario for Bftpd. 
Debloatable  
Feature 
Conservative 
Scenario 
Moderate 
Scenario 
Aggressive 
Scenario 
Admin Commands X X X 
Read Commands       
Write Commands     X 
Directory  
Commands   X X 
Server Config  
Commands   X X 
Miscellaneous  
Commands   X X 
Server Info  
Commands     X 
 
 
 
Table A.3: Debloated features per scenario for libcurl. 
Debloatable  
Feature 
Conservative 
Scenario 
Moderate 
Scenario 
Aggressive 
Scenario 
Uncommon  
API Elements X X X 
HTTP     X 
HTTPS     X 
RTSP X X X 
FTP Read Commands    X 
FTP Write Commands  X X 
FTPS  X X 
Telnet X X X 
LDAP  X X 
TFTP X X   
IMAP   X X 
SMB   X X 
SMTP   X X 
POP3   X X 
RTMP X X X 
File X X X 
Gopher X X X 
Dict X X X 
SCP X X X 
SFTP   X X 
Table A.4: Debloated features per scenario for mongoose. 
Debloatable  
Feature 
Conservative 
Scenario 
Moderate 
Scenario 
Aggressive 
Scenario 
Threads API     X 
Broadcast API X     
IPV6 X   X 
COAP     X 
DNS  X X 
HTTP Server       
HTP CGI X     
Websocket      
HTTP Client     X 
Websocket       
MQTT    X 
SNTP X   X 
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